Incidence of wrong-site surgery list errors for a 2-year period in a single national health service board by Geraghty, Alistair et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLEIncidence of Wrong-Site Surgery List Errors for a
2-Year Period in a Single National Health Service BoardAlistair Geraghty, MBChB, BSc, MRCS,* Lorna Ferguson, RGN, BSc, MSc,†
CraigMcIlhenny,MBChB, PGC,MEd, FRCS(Urol), FFST(Ed),*† and Paul Bowie, PhD, C.Erg.HF, FRCPEd‡§Introduction:Wrong-site/side surgical “never events” continue to cause
considerable harm to patients, healthcare professionals, and organizations
within the UnitedKingdom. Incidence has remained static despite the man-
datory introduction of surgical checklists. Operating theater list errors have
been identified as a regular contributor to these never events. The aims of
the study were to identify and to learn from the incidence of wrong-site/
side list errors in a single National Health Service board.
Methods: The study was conducted in a single National Health Service
board serving a population of approximately 300,000. All theater teams
systematically recorded errors identified at the morning theater brief or
checklist pause as part of a board-wide quality improvement project. Data
were reviewed for a 2-year period from May 2013 to April 2015, and all
episodes of wrong-site/side list errors were identified for analysis.
Results: No episodes of wrong-site/side surgery were recorded for the
study period. A total of 86 wrong-site/side list errors were identified in
29,480 cases (0.29%). There was considerable variation in incidence be-
tween surgical specialties with ophthalmology recording the largest propor-
tion of errors per number of surgical cases performed (1 in 87 cases)
and gynecology recording the smallest proportion (1 in 2671 cases). The
commonest errors to occur were “wrong-side” list errors (62/86, 72.1%).
Discussion: This is the first study to identify incidence of wrong-site/site
list errors in the United Kingdom. Reducing list errors should form part of
a wider risk reduction strategy to reduce wrong-site/side never events.
Human factors barrier management analysis may help identify the most
effective checks and controls to reduce list errors incidence, whereas
resilience engineering approaches should help develop understanding
of how to best capture and neutralize errors.
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W rong-site surgery has consistently been one of thecommonest “never events” to occur in UK hospitals since
data collection began in 2009.1,2 In the United Kingdom (UK),
a wrong-site surgery never event is defined as “a surgical inter-
vention performed on the wrong patient or wrong site… detected
at any time after the start of the procedure.”3 In the United States,
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J Patient Saf • Volume 00, Number 00, Month 2017definition.4–6 It is estimated that wrong-site surgery occurs in ap-
proximately 1 in 100,000 cases but could be as common as 4.5 in
10,000 cases dependent on the procedure being performed.7,8
There were 124 cases of wrong-site surgery recorded between
April 2014 and March 2015 in the UK; this is the highest level
documented in a single year.9 By definition, these never events
should be avoidable, but wrong-site surgery is far from being
eradicated and continues to cause harm to patients and families,
attract negative headlines in the mainstream media, and dismay
from patient organizations.10 Other consequences include the
psychological impact on the well-being of health professionals
involved,11 complaints, and medicolegal action and damage to
individual and organizational reputations.12
Much of the emphasis on preventing wrong-site surgery has
been placed on the immediate perioperative period, with particular
attention paid to site marking and checklist processes. The World
Health Organization safer surgery checklist has been mandated in
the UK since February 201013 with the similar Universal Protocol
in the United States established since 2004. While there is evidence
for reduction in mortality and morbidity with checklist use,14,15 this
is in the context of more complex cultural shifts.16 In the UK, there
remains considerable variation in checklist implementation.17 The
impact of checklists on wrong-site surgery events is less clear.7,8
Studies have suggested a downward trend in wrong-site surgery
events in different surgical contexts but rarely have these proved
statistically significant.18–22
There is recognition that given the complexity of the problem,
checklist processes cannot prevent all cases of wrong-site surgery.
Several upstream and downstream errors have been identified that
can propagate through or bypass checklists altogether. In an exam-
ination of 308 wrong-site surgery events by Paull et al,23 48(16%)
were deemed nonpreventable through checklist processes, with 32
(67%) of these identified as upstream errors and 16 (33%) as
downstream errors.23 One commonly identified upstream error
is that of incorrect listing of the operation. In a 2014 review of
wrong-site procedure data, 59 (11%) of 541 cases of wrong-site
procedures were related to incorrect information from the surgeons'
office. These included 34 operations on the wrong side, 2 operations
at the wrong spinal level, 8 procedures at the wrong site (e.g. wrong
finger), and 15 incorrect procedures.24 Upstream scheduling errors
seem to be an important feature generally of wrong-site surgery
events. In a reviewof “near-miss” and truewrong-site surgery events,
incorrect scheduling was the most commonly cited contributing fac-
tor in 111 of 427 cases.25 In a follow-up study comparing these near
misses and true never events incorrect scheduling information was
more commonly captured in the near-miss group compared with
the wrong-site surgery group.26 Finally, Neily et al27 identified
scheduling problems as the fifth most common “root cause” for
a wrong procedure behind other human factors issues such as
communication, time-out, and nonstandardization problems.
Theater list errors are commonly implicated in episodes of
wrong side, site, or procedure surgery and have the potential to
act as a lead point or propagating factor for these never events.28
Against this background, this study aims to identify the incidencewww.journalpatientsafety.com 1
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list errors by surgical specialty in a UK hospital.METHODS
Setting and Context
The study was conducted in a single National Health Service
(NHS) board, which serves a population of approximately 300,000.
It includes an 860-bed district general hospital containing 16 oper-
ating theaters and a smaller satellite hospital with a day case
ophthalmology theater. Included surgical specialties are ear, nose
and throat (ENT), general surgery, gynecology, ophthalmology,
oral and maxillofacial surgery (OMFS), orthopedics, urology, and
vascular surgery.
The hospital theater department has engaged in a systematic pro-
gramof quality improvement (QI) since 2008 influenced by themodel
developed by Langley et al.29,30 Daily safety huddles31 and weekly
safety meetings are used to coordinate QI activities. One strand of this
QI project involves the monitoring and improvement of prelist brief-
ing and checklist use. Individual theaters began collecting data on
potential “harm prevented” at theater briefs and checklist pauses
to determine whether checklist modifications resulted in improve-
ments. These data include all errors discussed or captured at the
morning briefing or checklist pauses. Since May 2013, this data
collection has been embedded in all theaters across the NHS board.
Data Collection
Data are collected by staff in individual theaters on the principal
paper copy of the theater list in real time; this information is collated
on a daily basis by a theater coordinator and stored on a spread-
sheet alongside data from the Scottish Patient Safety Programme
(SPSP).32 The SPSP is a national QI program, which requires hos-
pitals to audit and improve care processes targeted to reducing
specific adverse events; in operating theaters, this includes moni-
toring and acting on data on briefing and checklist use, glucose
control, and prophylactic antibiotics use.
Data Analysis
Data from May 2013 to April 2015 were reviewed and ana-
lyzed by A.G. All data relating to theater list errors were extracted
for analysis. Additional information was extracted from SPSP data.
Data were examined using Microsoft Excel (2010, Microsoft Corp,
Redmond, WA) and are presented as simple frequency counts and
percentages by surgical specialty.TABLE 1. Incidence of WSSP List Errors by Surgical Specialty
Specialty













A total of 29,480 theater cases were performed for the study
period. No cases of wrong-side, wrong-site, or wrong-procedure
surgery were recorded. The SPSP data confirm all theater lists
began with a safety brief and checklist pauses were completed
before every procedure. Nine cases, where the side or planned
procedures were changed on the day of surgery because of a
change in the patients' condition, were not included as WSSP
errors. There were further 2 cases where no side was documented
on the theater list.
A total of 86 WSSP list errors (0.29%) were recorded for the
2-year period. The incidence ofWSSP errors by individual surgical
specialty is outlined in Table 1. Ophthalmology recorded the largest
proportion of errors per number of surgical cases performed (1 in
87 cases), with gynecology recording the smallest proportion (1 in
2671 cases).
The list error type that occurred most frequently was epi-
sodes of potential “wrong-side” surgery (62/86, 72.1%), most
(33/62, 53.2%) of which were associated with ophthalmology
cases (Table 2).
DISCUSSION
For the 2-year study period, there were no cases of wrong-site/
side or procedure surgery in the hospital, but there were a total of
86WSSP list errors. This approximates to 1WSSP list error every
10 to 14 days. There was considerable variation in incidence by
specialty, with 1 in 87 cases incorrectly listed in ophthalmology
theaters to 1 in 2671 in gynecology. In specialties with a high
degree of laterality to disease (ophthalmology/orthopedics),
there was an increased proportion of wrong-side listing com-
pared with other specialties.
One of the strengths of this study is that data have been col-
lected prospectively in real time. The data collection process has
been refined through application of QI methodology30 to mini-
mize any additional workload to frontline theater staff and, there-
fore, to maximize reporting. Information is handwritten on the
principal theater list during the morning theater briefing and sub-
sequent safety pauses without the need for any additional forms or
repetition. The collation of data by theater coordinators is paired
with the established SPSP data collection process, again minimiz-
ing additional workload. Because there were no episodes of
wrong-site surgery for the study period, it is likely that all WSSP
errors were reported on theater lists; any underreporting could
only occur at the collating level. One shortcoming of this real-
time data collection process is that there is limited detail on theases
Incidence
0.01150782 1 in 87 cases
0.00200774 1 in 498 cases
0.00160085 1 in 625 cases
0.00417246 1 in 240 cases
0.00220345 1 in 454 cases
0.00232992 1 in 429 cases
0.00131926 1 in 758 cases
0.00037439 1 in 2671 cases
— —
0 0.00291723 1 in 343 cases
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Ophthalmology 33 5 — 1 39
Orthopedics 11 1 — 2 14
General 3 1 4 1 9
OMFS 5 — 1 — 6
Urology 3 1 2 — 6
ENT 1 — 4 — 5
Vascular 2 — — — 2
Gynecology — — 1 — 1
Unknown 4 — — — 4
Total 62 8 12 4 86
*Bilateral/unilateral errors where the patient was listed for a unilateral
procedure but required bilateral or vice versa.
BOX 1. Factors that contribute to incorrect scheduling and
potential contributory factors in wrong-site surgery
1. Booking documents not verified by office schedulers
2. Schedulers accepting verbal requests for surgical bookings instead
of written documents
3. Unapproved abbreviations, cross-outs, and illegible handwriting
used on the booking form
J Patient Saf • Volume 00, Number 00, Month 2017 Incidence of Wrong-Site Surgery List Errorsunderlying nature of the errors and no further investigation to
determine what other system-wide factors interacted to contrib-
ute to the errors that occurred, minimizing opportunities for
team or organizational learning and improvement. On identify-
ing the incidence of list errors by specialty, the head of each de-
partment was notified allowing them to set up independent
audit processes. In addition, the “harm-prevented” data collated
within theaters are shared on a monthly basis across all depart-
ments, mid and senior management, and the chief executive to
provide regular updates on errors identified and captured within
the theater department. The hospital is shortly to begin a wider
analysis of the listing process, barriers, and checks in partnership
with the Patient Safety & Quality Improvement team within NHS
Education for Scotland.
Nine instances where the theater list was altered on the day of
surgery because of a change in patient circumstances were
not included as errors. These episodes were felt to be symptom-
atic of disease progression and occurred approximately once
every 2 to 3 months. It is possible that the data set underreports
these episodes if these details were not recorded at the time.
However, with application of the NHS 12-week waiting time
guarantee between a patient being placed on a waiting list and
the procedure being carried out these types of errors should
be minimized. A further potential source for changes to the list
on the day of surgery is the use of pooled surgical lists. This entails
numerous surgeons sharing a combined waiting list for common
procedures, but there is potential for differing clinical opinions as
to the best operative management of a patient; again, this detail is
not recorded in the data set. It is unclear why ophthalmology has
a greater incidence of list errors compared with other specialties,
including those with a high degree of laterality. It is possible that
the specialty includes a higher proportion of patients with bilateral
disease such that clinicians and patients necessarily have to
identify a “worst” side to begin unilateral treatment. This could
introduce more subjectivity to the decision-making process,
in differing clinical opinion, or in variation of day-to-day
patient experience.
The data are consistent with previously published data on
scheduling errors.Wu et al33 examined the characteristics and cost
of scheduling errors, with the data set including the incidence of
WSSP errors. Of 17,606 procedures, there were a total of 77WSSP
errors (incidence = 0.00437351, 1 in 229 cases). This included 55
cases of wrong-side listing, 14 wrong procedure, 7 wrong site,© 2017 Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. All rights reserved.and 1 listedwith both thewrong procedure andwrong side. InNeily
et al's27 2009 review of wrong-site surgery the incidence of wrong
site never events is broken down by specialty; it is noteworthy that
this incidence closely resembles the incidence of WSSP listing
errors by specialty identified in this study. This again suggests
an association between list errors and wrong-site surgery and
its potential as a target to reduce never events.
Although list errors are not a prerequisite for a never event, they
can play a significant role, working through 3 distinct mecha-
nisms. Firstly, theater lists can act as a lead point for never events
if the error is copied on to patient consent and subsequent docu-
mentation. Secondly, they can act as a compounding factor
because the list is used to inform theater layout and equipment
setup, that is, theater could be set up for a right- or left-sided
procedure. Indeed, patient positioning errors are a known inde-
pendent risk factor for wrong-site surgery.25 Finally, regular list
errors have the potential to normalize discrepancies between
documentation and procedure being carried out. This could
have an impact on staff raising concerns and cultural drift more
generally.34 Scheduling errors have been identified as the fifth
most common root cause of wrong-site/side never events27 and
may contribute to approximately 25% of all such events.25 With
the incidence of wrong-site/side never events seemingly static
across the UK, list errors need to be addressed as part of a wider
risk reduction strategy.
The Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare
previously identified 3 contributing factors to incorrect schedul-
ing; these can be seen in Box 1.4Computer software also has a role in the generation of, or
protection against, list errors. Cima et al35 reported on the intro-
duction of a new electronic scheduling system within the Mayo
Clinic, which significantly reduced scheduling errors in both
gynecology and colorectal surgery. The UK software interfaces
should be reviewed to ensure risk of left/right slips and lapses
are minimized during list formulation. For the clinician, a prag-
matic approach must ensue. List errors should be recognized as
a real and recurring threat. Surgeons must resist the temptation
to “short cut” and use the theater list as a primary source for
consenting. Consenting should include a reconciliation process
to ensure patient findings, imaging, letters, and lists match.
Surgeon involvement in this reconciliation process has been
identified as being the greatest contributor to the prevention
of wrong-site surgery.25 As the UK increasingly moves toward
pooled surgical lists and patients arriving on the day of surgery,
there can be considerable time pressure to meet patients for the
first time, review notes, and consent before the start of theater.
Organizations should, therefore, examine clinical and admin-
istrative systems to ensure that there is adequate time to com-
plete these procedures properly and ensure that all notes and
imaging, be they electronic or paper, are easily accessible in
consenting areas.
Different human factors concepts and approaches routinely
used in safety-critical industries may be helpful to NHS care teamswww.journalpatientsafety.com 3
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related to complex problems such as surgical list errors and never
events.36 The use of barrier management methods can assist us to
better assess care systems to identify and improve existing patient
safety “controls” and “safeguards” for reducing risks.37 This can
be achieved either as a proactive safety management approach
or retrospectively as part of incident investigations. This enables
assessment and identification of the full range of protective con-
trols thought to be in place, how robust they actually are and
how they can be defeated, and who in the organization has respon-
sibility for implementing, supporting and maintaining each type
of safety control.37
Similarly, there is growing interest in healthcare and other high
hazard industries in the human factors subdomain of resilience
engineering.38 This discipline advocates the need to strike a bal-
ance between the traditional approaches to safety management,
which are focused on reducing and eliminating the number of
things that gowrong (termed Safety-I), while optimizing and improv-
ing the number of things that go right (termed Safety-II). Given
that list errors and never events are comparatively rare, it arguably
makes sense to begin to explore, understand, and learn from why
things go right in most surgical cases.
To more effectively influence surgical wrong-site/side list errors
and related never events will require targeted education and training
of the surgical workforce (and others including organizational
leaders and NHS policymakers) in fundamental human factors
principles and approaches. This goal is embedded in policy in
NHS England39 and is now appearing in national surgical training
curricula. However, a broader and more comprehensive under-
standing of human factors as a systems and design-based disci-
pline will be necessary if frontline care teams (“field experts”)
are to untangle the complexities of system interactions that can
contribute to list errors and never events and design effective solu-
tions to reduce risks thereby enhancing human and organizational
performance and well-being in this area.CONCLUSIONS
This is the first UK data to identify the incidence of WSSP list
errors. Data are similar to a previously published study from the
United States,33 but there is no other direct UK comparison. It
would be very useful to repeat this data collection process in
similar surgical settings for comparison. Awider project to under-
stand and define the association between system failures, including
list errors, and wrong-site surgery events in the UK could further
legitimize it as a target for reducing wrong-site surgery. We have
demonstrated considerable interspecialty variation in WSSP list
error incidence. This requires further examinationwithmore com-
prehensive data collection, informed by human factors thinking
and methods, to understand the exact nature of these differences
and begin to formulate system (re)design interventions to reduce
error incidence.
List errors are an attractive target and act as strong system sig-
nals40 in the fight against wrong-site surgery. They are clearly
implicated in the development of wrong-site surgery events,
and it would be useful to more clearly understand and define this
association and begin to design solutions to strengthen system
barriers and safety management procedures. Tracking theater
list errors could be an attractive process measure in national QI
strategies because it provides a clear binary end point—an oper-
ation can be listed either correctly or incorrectly. There is poten-
tial for such data to act as a lagging indicator41 to help identify
hospitals at increased risk of wrong-site surgery never events.
Overall, the list errors themselves need to be addressed by exam-
ining how lists are compiled, processed, and implemented from4 www.journalpatientsafety.comhuman factors–based systems and design perspective to develop
and test interventions for further minimizing the risk of cata-
strophic wrong-site surgery.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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